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Abstract
Randomized protocols for hiding private information
can often be regarded as noisy channels in the information-
theoretic sense, and the inference of the concealed informa-
tion can be regarded as a hypothesis-testing problem. We
consider the Bayesian approach to the problem, and inves-
tigate the probability of error associated to the inference
when the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability) decision
rule is adopted. Our main result is a constructive character-
ization of a convex base of the probability of error, which al-
lows us to compute its maximum value (over all possible in-
puts’ distribution), and to identify functional upper bounds
for it. As a side result, we are able to substantially improve
the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy bounds expressed
in terms of conditional entropy. We then discuss an appli-
cation of our methodology to the Crowds protocol, and in
particular we show how to compute the bounds on the prob-
ability that an adversary break anonymity.
1 Introduction
Information-hiding protocols try to hide the relation be-
tween certain facts, that we wish to maintain hidden, and the
observable consequences of these facts. Example of such
protocols are the anonymity protocols like Crowds [21],
Onion Routing [26], and Freenet [7]. Often these protocols
use randomization to obfuscate the link between the hidden
information and the observed events. Crowds, for instance,
tries to conceal the identity of the originator of a message
by forwarding randomly the message till its destination, so
that if an attacker intercepts the message, it cannot be sure
whether the sender is the originator or just a forwarder.
In most cases, protocols like the above can be regarded
as information-theoretic channels, where the inputs are the
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facts to keep hidden, the outputs are the observables, and the
matrix represents the correlation between the facts and the
observed events, in terms of conditional probabilities. An
adversary can try to infer the facts from the observed events
with the Bayesian method, which is based on the principle
of assuming an a priori probability distribution on the hid-
den facts (hypotheses), and deriving from that (and from the
matrix) the a posteriori distribution after a certain event has
been observed. It is well known that the best strategy for
the adversary is to apply the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori
Probability) criterion, which, as the name says, dictates to
choose the hypothesis with the maximum a posteriori prob-
ability. “Best” means that this criterion induces the smallest
probability of guessing the wrong hypothesis. The proba-
bility of error, in this case, is also called Bayes’ risk.
Even if the adversary does not know the a priori distribu-
tion, the method is still valid asymptotically, under the con-
dition that the matrix’ rows are all pairwise distinguished.
By repeating the experiment, in fact, the contribution of the
a priori probability becomes less and less relevant for the
computation of the a posteriori probability, and it “washes
out” in the limit. Furthermore, the probability of error con-
verges to 0 in the limit [8]. If the rows are all equal, namely
if the channel has capacity 0, then the Bayes’ risk is maxi-
mal and does not converge to 0. This is the ideal situation,
from the point of view of information-hiding protocols. In
practice, however, it is difficult to achieve such degree of
privacy. We are then interested in maximizing the Bayes’
risk, so to make the convergence to 0 as slow as possible.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the Bayes’
risk, in relation to the channel’s matrix, and its bounds.
There are many bounds known in literature for the
Bayes’ risk. One of these is the equivocation bound, due
to Re´nyi [22], which states that the probability of error is
bound by the conditional entropy of the channel’s input
given the output. Later, Hellman and Raviv improved this
bound by half [13]. Recently, Santhi and Vardy have pro-
posed a new bound, that depends exponentially on the (op-
posite of the) conditional entropy, and which considerably
improves the Hellman-Raviv bound in the case of multi-
hypothesis testing [23].
1.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
1. We consider what we call “the corner points” of a
piecewise linear function, and we propose criteria to
compute the maximum of the function, and to identify
concave upper bounds for it, based on the analysis of
its corner points only.
2. We consider the hypothesis testing problem in relation
to an information-theoretic channel. In this context,
we show that the probability of error associated to the
MAP rule is piecewise linear, and we give a construc-
tive characterization of a set of corner points, which
turns out to be finite. Together with the previous re-
sults, this leads to constructive methods to compute
the maximum probability of error over all the chan-
nel’s input distributions, and to define tight functional
upper bounds.
3. As a side result of the above study, we are able to
improve on the Hellman-Raviv and the Santhi-Vardy
bounds, which express relations between the Bayes
risk and the conditional entropy. The Santhi-Vardy
bound, which is better than the Hellman-Raviv one
when we consider more than two hypotheses, is tight
(i.e. it coincides with the Bayes’ risk) on the corner
points only in the case of channels with capacity 0.
Our improved bound is tight on those points for every
channel. The same holds with respect to the Hellman-
Raviv bound (the latter is better than the Santhi-Vardy
one in the case of two hypotheses).
4. We show how to apply the above results to random-
ized protocols for information hiding. In particular,
we work out in detail the application to Crowds, and
derive the maximum probability of error for an adver-
sary who tries to break anonymity, and bounds on this
probability in terms of conditional entropy, for any in-
put distribution.
1.2 Related work
Probabilistic notions of anonymity and information-
hiding have been explored in [4, 12, 1, 2]. We discuss the
relation with these works in detail in Section 5.
A recent line of work has been dedicated to exploring the
concept of anonymity from an information-theoretic point
of view [24, 10]. The main difference with our approach
is that in those works the anonymity degree is expressed
in terms of input entropy, rather than conditional entropy.
More precisely, the emphasis is on the lack of information
of the attacker about the distribution of the users, rather than
on the capability of the protocol to conceal this information
despite of the observables that are made available to the at-
tacker. Moreover, a uniform user distribution is assumed,
while in this paper we abstract from the user distribution in
the functional sense.
In [17, 18] the ability to have covert communication as
a result of non-perfect anonymity is explored. Those works
focus on the possibility of constructing covert channels by
the users of the protocol, using the protocol mechanisms,
and on measuring the amount of information that can be
transferred through these channels. In [18] the authors also
suggest that the channel’s capacity can be used as an asymp-
totic measure of the worst-case information leakage. An-
other information-theoretical approach is the one of [9],
where the authors use the notion of relative entropy to de-
fine the degree of anonymity.
In the field of information flow and non-interference
there is a line of research which is related to ours. There
have been various works [16, 11, 5, 6, 14] in which the the
high information and the low information are seen as the in-
put and output respectively of a channel. From an abstract
point of view, the setting is very similar; technically it does
not matter what kind of information we are trying to con-
ceal, what is relevant for the analysis is only the probabilis-
tic relation between the input and the output information.
The conceptual and technical novelties of this paper w.r.t.
the above works are explained in Section 1.1. We believe
that our results are applicable more or less directly also to
the field of non-interference.
The connection between the adversary’s goal of inferring
a secret from the observables, and the field of “hypothesis
testing”, has been explored in other papers in literature, see
in particular [15, 19, 20, 3]. To our knowledge, however,
[3] is the only work exploring the Bayes’ risk in connection
to the channel associated to an information-hiding proto-
col. More precisely, [3] considers a framework in which
anonymity protocols are interpreted as particular kinds of
channels, and the degree of anonymity provided by the pro-
tocol as the converse of the channel’s capacity (an idea al-
ready suggested in [18]). Then, [3] considers a scenario in
which the adversary can enforce the re-execution of the pro-
tocol with the same input, and studies the Bayes’ risk on the
repeated experiment. The focus is on how the adversary can
approximate the MAP rule when the a priori distribution is
not known, and the main result of [3] on this topic is the
investigation of the characteristics of the matrix that make
this task possible or impossible. In the present paper, on
the contrary, we study the Bayes’ risk as a function of the
a priori distribution, and we give criteria to compute tight
bounds for it.
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1.3 Plan of the paper
Next section recalls some basic notions in information
theory, and about hypothesis testing and probability of er-
ror. Section 3 proposes some methods to identify tight
bounds for a function that is generated by a set of corner
points. Section 4 presents the main result of our work,
namely a constructive characterization of the corner points
of Bayes’ risk. In Section 5 we discuss the relation with
some probabilistic information-hiding notions in literature.
Finally, Section 6 illustrates an application of our results to
the anonymity protocol Crowds.
The report version of this paper, containing the proofs,
is available on line at: http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/
∼catuscia/papers/ProbabilityError/full.pdf
2 Information theory, hypothesis testing and
probability of error
In this section we briefly revise some basic notions in
information theory and hypothesis testing that will be used
trough the paper. We refer to [8] for more details.
A channel is a tuple 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 where A,O are the
sets of input and output values respectively and p(o|a) is
the conditional probability of observing output o ∈ O when
a ∈ A is the input. In this paper, we assume that both A
and O are finite with cardinality n and m respectively. We
will also sometime use indices to represent their elements:
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and O = {o1, a2, . . . , om}. The
p(o|a)’s constitute what is called the matrix of the channels.
The usual convention is to arrange the a’s by rows and the
o’s by columns.
In general, we consider the input of a channel as hidden
information, and the output as observable information. The
set of input values can also be regarded as a set of mutu-
ally exclusive (hidden) facts or hypotheses. A probability
distribution p(·) over A is called a priori probability, and it
induces a probability distribution over O (called marginal
probability of O). In fact
p(o) =
∑
a
p(a, o) =
∑
a
p(o|a) p(a)
where p(a, o) represents the joint probability of a and o, and
we use its Bayesian definition p(a, o) = p(o|a)p(a).
When we observe an output o, the probability that the
corresponding input has been a certain a is given by the
conditional probability p(a|o), also called a posteriori prob-
ability of a given o, which in general is different from p(a).
This difference can be interpreted as the fact that observing
o gives us evidence that changes our degree of belief in the
hypothesis a. The a priori and the a posteriori probabilities
of a are related by Bayes’ theorem:
p(a|o) =
p(o|a) p(a)
p(o)
In hypothesis testing we try to infer the true hypothe-
sis (i.e. the input fact that really took place) from the ob-
served output. In general it is not possible to determine
the right hypothesis with certainty. We are interested, then,
in minimizing the probability of error, i.e. the probabil-
ity of making the wrong guess. Formally, the probability
of error is defined as follows. Given the decision function
f : O → A adopted by the observer to infer the hypothesis,
let Ef : A → O be the function that gives the error region
of f when a ∈ A has occurred, namely:
Ef (a) = {o ∈ O | f(o) 6= a}
Let ηf : A → [0, 1] be the function that associates to each
a ∈ A the probability that f gives the the wrong input fact
when a ∈ A has occurred, namely:
ηf (a) =
∑
o∈Ef (a)
p(o|a)
The probability of error for f is then obtained as the sum of
the probability of error for each possible input, averaged on
the probability of the input:
Pf =
∑
a
p(a) ηn(a)
In the Bayesian framework, the best possible decision func-
tion fB , namely the decision function that minimizes the
probability of error, is obtained by applying the MAP (Max-
imum Aposteriori Probability) criterion, that chooses an in-
put a with a maximal p(a|o). Formally:
fB(o) = a ⇒ ∀a
′ p(a|o) ≥ p(a′|o)
The probability of error associated to fB , aka Bayes’ risk,
is then given by
Pe = 1−
∑
o
p(o) max
a
p(a|o) = 1−
∑
o
max
a
p(o|a) p(a)
Note that fB , and the Bayes’ risk, depend on the inputs’
a priori probability. The input distributions can be repre-
sented as the elements ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of a domain
D(n) defined as
D(n) = {~x |
∑
i
xi = 1 and ∀i xi ≥ 0}
where the correspondence is given by ∀i xi = p(ai). In the
rest of the paper we will assume the MAP rule and view the
Bayes’ risk as a function Pe : D(n) → [0, 1] defined by
Pe(~x) = 1−
∑
i
max
j
p(oi|aj)xj (1)
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There are some notable results in literature relating the
Bayes’ risk to the information-theoretic notion of condi-
tional entropy, aka equivocation. Let us first recall the con-
cept of random variable and its entropy. A random variable
A is determined by a set of values A and a probability dis-
tribution p(a) over A. The entropy of A, H(A), is given
by
H(A) = −
∑
a
p(a) log p(a)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable.
It takes its maximum value logn when A’s distribution is
uniform and its minimum value 0 when A is constant. We
usually consider the logarithm with a base 2 and measure
entropy in bits.
Now let A,O be random variables. The conditional en-
tropy H(A|O) is defined as
H(A|O) = −
∑
o
p(o)
∑
a
p(a|o) log p(a|o)
The conditional entropy measures the amount of uncer-
tainty of A when O is known. It can be shown that 0 ≤
H(A|O) ≤ H(A). It takes its maximum value H(A) when
O reveals no information about A, i.e. when A and O are
independent, and its minimum value 0 when O completely
determines the value of A.
Comparing H(A) and H(A|O) gives us the concept of
mutual information I(A;O), which is defined as
I(A;O) = H(A)−H(A|O)
Mutual information measures the amount of information
that one random variable contains about another random
variable. In other words, it measures the amount of uncer-
tainty about A that we lose when observing O. It can be
shown that it is symmetric (I(A;O) = I(A;O)) and that
0 ≤ I(A;O) ≤ H(A). The maximum mutual information
between A and O over all possible input distributions p(a)
is known as the channel’s capacity:
C = max
p(a)
I(A;O)
The capacity of a channel gives the maximum rate at which
information can be transmitted using this channel.
Given a channel, let ~x be the a priori distribution on the
inputs. Recall that ~x also determines a probability distri-
bution on the outputs. Let A and O be the random vari-
ables associated to the inputs and outputs respectively. The
Bayes’ risk is related to H(A|O) by the Hellman and Ra-
viv’s bound [13]:
Pe(~x) ≤
1
2
H(A|O) (2)
and by the Santhi and Vardy’s bound [23]:
Pe(~x) ≤ 1− 2
−H(A|O) (3)
We remark that, while the bound (2) is tighter than (3) in
case of binary hypothesis testing, i.e. when n = 2, (3) gives
a much better bound when n becomes larger. In particular
the bound in (3) is always limited by 1, which is not the case
for (2).
3 Convexly generated functions and their
bounds
In this section we characterize a special class of func-
tions on probability distributions, and we present various re-
sults regarding their bounds which lead to methods to com-
pute their maximum, to prove that a concave function is an
upper bound, and to derive an upper bound from a concave
function. The interest of this study is that the probability of
error will turn out to be a function in this class.
We start by recalling some basic notions: let R be the
set of real numbers. The elements λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R
constitute a set of convex coefficients iff ∀i λi ≥ 0 and∑
i λi = 1. Given a vector space V , a convex combination
of ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xk ∈ V is any vector of the form
∑
i λi ~x
i
where the λi’s are convex coefficients. A subset S of V is
convex iff every convex combination of vectors in S is still
in S. It is easy to see that for any n the domain D(n) of
probability distributions of dimension n is convex. Given a
subset S of V , the convex hull of S, which we will denote
by ch(S), is the smallest convex set containing S. It is well
known that ch(S) always exists.
We now introduce (with a slight abuse of terminology)
the concept of convex base:
Definition 3.1 Given the vector sets S,U , we say that U is
a convex base for S iff U ⊆ S and S ⊆ ch(U).
In the following, given a vector ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn),
we will use the notation (~x, f(~x)) to denote the vector (in a
space with an additional dimension) (x1, x2, . . . , xn, f(~x)).
Similarly, given a vector set S in a n-dimensional space, we
will use the notation (S, f(S)) to represent the vector set
{(~x, f(~x)) | ~x ∈ S} in a (n + 1)-dimensional space. The
notation f(S) represents the image of f in S, i.e. f(S) =
{f(~x) | ~x ∈ S}.
We are now ready to introduce the class of functions that
we announced at the beginning of this section:
Definition 3.2 Given a vector set S, a convex base U of
S, and a function f : S → R, we say that (U, f(U)) is
a set of corner points of f iff (U, f(U)) is a convex base
for (S, f(S)). We also say that f is convexly generated by
f(U)1.
1To be more precise we should say that f is convexly generated by
(U, f(U)).
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Of particular interest are the functions that are convexly
generated by a finite number of corner points. This is true
for piecewise linear functions in which S can be decom-
posed into finitely many convex polytopes (n-dimensional
polygons) and f is equal to a linear function on each of
them. Such functions are convexly generately by the (finite)
set of vertices of these polytopes.
We now give a criterion for computing the maximum of
a convexly generated function.
Proposition 3.3 Let f : S → R be convexly generated by
f(U). If f(U) has a maximum element b, then b is the max-
imum value of f on S.
Proof Let b be the maximum of f(U). Then for every
u ∈ U we have that f(u) ≤ b. Consider now a vector
~x ∈ S. Since f is convexly generated by f(U), there exist
~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~uk in U such that f(~x) is obtained by convex
combination from f(~u1), f(~u2), . . . , f(~uk) via some con-
vex coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λk. Hence:
f(~x) =
∑
i λif(~u
i)
≤
∑
i λib since f(~ui) ≤ b
= b λi’s being convex combinators

Note that if U is finite then f(U) has always a maximum
element.
Next, we propose a method for proving (functional) up-
per bounds for f , when they are in the form of concave
functions.
We recall that, given a vector set S, a function g : S → R
is concave iff for any ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xk ∈ S and any set of
convex coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λk ∈ R we have∑
i
λi g(~x
i) ≤ g(
∑
i
λi~x
i)
Proposition 3.4 Let f : S → R be convexly generated by
f(U) and let g : S → R be concave. Assume that for all
~u ∈ U f(~u) ≤ g(~u) holds. Then we have that g is an upper
bound for f , i.e.
∀~x ∈ S f(~x) ≤ g(~x)
Proof Let ~x be an element of S. Since f is con-
vexly generated, there exist ~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~uk in U such
that (~x, f(~x)) is obtained by convex combination from
(~u1, f(~u1)), (~u2, f(~u2)), . . . , (~uk, f(~uk)) via some convex
coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λk. Hence:
f(~x) =
∑
i λif(~u
i)
≤
∑
i λig(~u
i) since f(~ui) ≤ g(~ui)
≤ g(
∑
i λi~u
i) by the concavity of g
= g(~x)

Finally, we give a method to obtain tight functional upper
bounds from concave functions.
Proposition 3.5 Let f : S → R be convexly generated by
f(U) and let g : S → R be concave. Assume that for
each ~u ∈ U if g(~u) = 0 then f(~u) ≤ 0. Consider the set
R = {f(~u)/g(~u) | ~u ∈ U, g(~u) 6= 0}. If R has a maximum
element c, then the function c g is a tight functional upper
bound for f , i.e.
∀~x ∈ S f(~x) ≤ c g(~x)
and f and c g coincide at least in one point.
Proof Since c is the maximum of R, we have that, for
every ~u ∈ U with g(~u) 6= 0, f(~u) ≤ c g(~u) holds. On the
other hand, if g(~u) = 0, then f(~u) ≤ 0 = c g(~u). Hence
by Proposition 3.4 we have that c g is an upper bound for
f . Furthermore, if ~v is the vector for which f(~u)/g(~u) is
maximum, then f(~v) = c g(~v) so the bound is tight. 
Note that, if U is finite, then the maximum element of R
always exists.
3.1 An alternative proof for the Hellman-
Raviv and Santhi-Vardy bounds
Using Proposition 3.4 we can give an alternative, sim-
pler proof for the bounds in (2) and (3). We start with the
following proposition, whose proof can be found in the ap-
pendix:
Proposition 3.6 Let f : D(n) → R be the function f(~y) =
1 − maxj yj . Then f is convexly generated by f(U) with
U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Un where, for each k, Uk is the set
of all vectors that have value 1/k in exactly k components,
and 0 everywhere else.
Consider now the functions g, h : D(n) → R defined as
g(~y) =
1
2
H(~y) and h(~y) = 1− 2−H(~y)
where (with a slight abuse of notation) H represents the
entropy of the distribution ~y, i.e. H(~y) = −
∑
j yj log yj .
We have that both g and h satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 3.4 with respect to f , and therefore
∀~y ∈ D(n) f(~y) ≤ g(~y) and f(~y) ≤ h(~y) (4)
The rest of the proof proceeds as in [13] and [23]:
Let ~x represent an a priori distribution on A and let the
above ~y denote the a posteriori probabilities on A with
respect to a certain observable o, i.e. yj = p(aj |o) =
5
(p(o|aj)/p(o))xj . Then Pe(~x) =
∑
o p(o)f(~y), so from
(4) we obtain
Pe(~x) ≤
∑
o
p(o)
1
2
H(~y) =
1
2
H(A|O) (5)
and
Pe(~x) ≤
∑
o
p(o)(1− 2−H(~y)) ≤ 1− 2−H(A|O) (6)
where the last step in (6) is obtained by applying Jensen’s
inequality. This concludes the alternative proof of (2) and
(3).
We end this section with two remarks. First, we note that
g coincides with f only on the points of U1 and U2, whereas
h coincides with f on all U . In fact, if ~uk is an element of
Uk, we have f(~u1) = 0 = 1/2 log 1 = g(~u1), f(~u2) =
1/2 = 1/2 log 2 = g(~u2), and for k ≥ 2, f(~uk) = 1 −
1/k < 1 while g(~uk) = 1/2 log k > 1. On the other hand,
for all k, h(~uk) = 1 − 2− log k = f(~uk). This explains,
intuitively, why (3) is a better bound than (2) for dimensions
higher than 2.
Second, we observe that, although h is a very tight bound
for f , when we average h and f on the output probabilities
to obtain
∑
o p(o)(1− 2
−H(~y)) and Pe(~x) respectively, and
then we apply Jensen’s inequality, we usually loosen this
bound a lot, as we will see in some examples later. The
only case in which we do not loose anything is when the
channel has capacity 0 (maximally noisy channel), i.e. all
the rows of the matrix are the same. In the general case of
non-zero capacity, however, this implies that if we want to
obtain a better bound we need to follow a different strategy.
In particular, we need to find directly the corner points of
Pe instead than those of the f defined above. This is what
we are going to do in the next section.
4 The corner points of the Bayes’ risk
In this section we present our main contribution, namely
we show that Pe is convexly generated by Pe(U) for a finite
U , and we give a constructive characterization of U , so that
we can apply the results of previous section to compute tight
bounds on Pe.
The idea behind the construction of such U is the fol-
lowing: recall that the Bayes’ risk is given by Pe(~x) =
1 −
∑
imaxj p(oi|aj)xj . Intuitively, this function is lin-
ear as long as, for each i, the j which gives the maximum
p(oi|aj)xj remains the same while we vary ~x. When, for
some i and k, the maximum becomes p(oi|ak)xk, the func-
tion changes its inclination and then it becomes linear again.
The exact point in which the inclination changes is a solu-
tion of the equation p(oi|aj)xj = p(oi|ak)xk. This equa-
tion actually represents a hyperplane (a space in n − 1 di-
mensions, where n is the cardinality of A) and the incli-
nation of Pe changes in all its points for which p(oi|aj)xj
is maximum, i.e. it satisfies the inequation p(oi|aj)xj ≥
p(oi|a`)x` for each `. The intersection of n − 1 hyper-
planes of this kind, and of the one determined by the equa-
tion
∑
j xj = 1, is a vertex ~v such that (~v, Pe(~v)) is a corner
point of Pe.
Definition 4.1 Given a channel C = 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, the
family S(C) of the systems generated by C is the set of all
systems of inequations of the following form:
p(oi1 |aj1)xj1 = p(oi1 |aj2)xj2
p(oi2 |aj2)xj2 = p(oi2 |aj3)xj3
.
.
.
p(oik |ajr−1 )xjr−1 = p(oik |ajr )xjr
xj = 0 for j 6∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jr}
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = 1
p(oih |ajh)xjh ≥ p(oih |a`)x` for 1 ≤ h, ` ≤ r, n
where n is the cardinality of A, r ≤ n, and j1, j2, . . . , jr
are pairwise different.
A system is called solvable if it has solutions. Note that a
system of the kind considered in the above definition has at
most one solution.
We are now ready to state our main result:
Theorem 4.2 Given a channel C, the Bayes’ risk Pe as-
sociated to C is convexly generated by Pe(U), where U is
constituted by the solutions to all solvable systems in S(C).
Proof We need to prove that, for every ~v ∈ D(n), there exist
~u1, ~u2, . . . , ~ut ∈ U , and convex combinators λ1, λ2, . . . , λt
such that
~v =
∑
i
λi~u
i and Pe(~v) =
∑
i
λiPe(~u
i)
Let us consider a particular ~v ∈ D(n). In the following,
for each i, we will use ji to denote the index j for which
p(oi|aj)vj is maximum. Hence, we can rewrite Pe(~v) as
Pe(~v) =
∑
i
p(oi|aji)vji (7)
We proceed by induction on n.
Base case (n = 2) In this case U is the set of solutions of
all the systems of the form
{p(oi|a1)x1 = p(oi|a2)x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
and ~v ∈ D(2). Let c be the minimum between v1 and the
minimum x ≥ 0 such that
p(oi|a1)(v1 − x) = p(oi|a2)(v2 + x) for some i
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Analogously, let d be the minimum between v2 and the min-
imum x ≥ 0 such that
p(oi|a2)(v2 − x) = p(oi|a1)(v1 + x) for some i
Let us define ~v1, ~v2 as
~v1 = (v1 − c, v2 + c) ~v
2 = (v1 + d, v2 − d)
Consider the convex coefficients
λ1 =
d
c+ d
λ2 =
c
c+ d
A simple calculation shows that
~v = λ1~v
1 + λ2~v
2
It remains to prove that
Pe(~v) = λ1Pe(~u
1) + λ2Pe(~u
2) (8)
To this end, we need to show that Pe is defined in ~v1 and ~v2
by the same formula as (7), i.e. that for each i and k 6= ji the
inequation p(oi|aji)v1ji ≥ p(oi|ak)v
1
k holds, and similarly
for ~v2.
Let i and k be given. If ji = 1, and consequently k = 2,
we have that for some x ≥ 0 the equality p(oi|a2)(v2−x) =
p(oi|a1)(v1 + x) holds. Therefore:
p(oi|a1)v
1
1 = p(oi|a1)(v1 − c) by definition of ~v1
= p(oi|a1)(v1 − x) since c ≤ x
= p(oi|a2)(v2 + x) by definition of x
≥ p(oi|a2)(v2 + c) since c ≤ x
= p(oi|a1)v
1
2 by definition of ~v1
If, on the other hand, ji = 2, and consequently k = 1, we
have:
p(oi|a2)v
1
2 = p(oi|a2)(v2 + c) by definition of ~v1
≥ p(oi|a2)v2 since c ≥ 0
= p(oi|a1)v1 since ji = 2
≥ p(oi|a1)(v1 − c) since c ≥ 0
= p(oi|a1)v
1
1 by definition of ~v1
The proof that for each i and k 6= ji the inequation
p(oi|aji)v
1
ji
≥ p(oi|ak)v
1
k holds is analogous.
Hence we have proved that
Pe(~v
1) =
∑
i
p(oi|aji)v
1
ji
and Pe(~v2) =
∑
i
p(oi|aji)v
2
ji
and a simple calculation shows that (8) holds.
Inductive case Let ~v ∈ D(n). Let c be the minimum be-
tween vn−1 and the minimum x ≥ 0 such that for some i
and k
p(oi|an−1)(vn−1 − x) = p(oi|an)(vn + x)
or
p(oi|an−1)(vn−1 − x) = p(oi|ak)vk k 6= n
or
p(oi|aji)vji = p(oi|an)(vn + x) ji 6= n− 1
Analogously, let d be the minimum between vn+1 and the
minimum x ≥ 0 such that for some i and k
p(oi|an)(vn − x) = p(oi|an−1)(vn−1 + x)
or
p(oi|an)(vn − x) = p(oi|ak)vk k 6= n− 1
or
p(oi|aji)vji = p(oi|an−1)(vn−1 + x) ji 6= n
Similarly to the base case, define ~v1, ~v2 as
~v1 = (v1, v2, . . . , vn−2, vn−1 − c, vn + c)
and
~v2 = (v1, v2, . . . , vn−2, vn−1 + d, vn − d)
and consider the same convex coefficients
λ1 =
d
c+ d
λ2 =
c
c+ d
Again, we have ~v = λ1~v1 + λ2~v2.
By case analysis, and following the analogous proof
given for n = 2, we can prove that for each i and k the
inequations p(oi|aji)v1ji ≥ p(oi|ak)v
1
k and p(oi|aji)v2ji ≥
p(oi|ak)v
2
k hold, hence, following the same lines as in the
base case, we derive
Pe(~v) = λ1Pe(~v
1) + λ2Pe(~v
2)
We now prove that ~v1 and ~v2 can be obtained as con-
vex combinations of corner points of Pe in the hyperplanes
(instances of D(n−1)) defined by the equations that give, re-
spectively, the c and d above. More precisely, if c = vn−1
the equation is xn−1 = 0. Otherwise, the equation is of the
form
p(oi|ak)xk = p(oi|a`)x`
and analogously for d. We develop the proof for ~v2; the
case of ~v1 is analogous.
If d = 0, then the hyperplane is defined by the equa-
tion xn = 0, and it consists of the set of vectors of the
form (x1, x2, . . . , xn−1). The Bayes’ risk is defined in this
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hyperplane exactly in the same way as Pe (since the con-
tribution of xn is null) and therefore the corner points are
the same. By inductive hypothesis, those corner points are
given by the solutions to the set of disequations of the form
given in Definition 4.1. To obtain the corner points in D(n)
it is sufficient to add the equation xn = 0.
Assume now that d is given by one of the other equa-
tions. Let us consider the first one, the cases of the other
two are analogous. Let us consider, therefore, the hyper-
plane H (instance of D(n− 1)) defined by the equation
p(oi|an)xn = p(oi|an−1)xn−1 (9)
It is convenient to perform a transformation of coordinates.
Namely, represent the elements of H as vectors ~y with
yj =
{
xj 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2
xn−1 j = n− 1
(10)
Consider the channel
C′ = 〈A′,O, p′(·|·)〉
with A′ = {a1, a2, . . . , an−1}, and
p′(ok|aj) =
{
p(ok|aj) 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 2
max{p1(k), p2(k)} j = n− 1
where
p1(k) = p(ok, an−1)
p(oi|an)
p(oi|an−1) + p(oi|an)
and
p2(k) = p(ok, an)
p(oi|an−1)
p(oi|an−1) + p(oi|an)
The Bayes’s risk in H is defined by
Pe(~y) =
∑
k
max
1≤j≤n−1
p′(ok|aj)yj
and a simple calculation shows that Pe(~y) = Pe(~x) when-
ever ~x satisfies (9) and ~y and ~x are related by (10). Hence
the corner points of Pe(~x) over H can be obtained from
those of Pe(~y).
The systems of inequations in S(C) are obtained from
those in S(C′) in the following way. For each system in
S(C′), replace the equation y1 + y2 + . . . + yn−1 = 1
by x1 + x2 + . . . + xn−1 + xn = 1, and replace, in
each equation, every occurrence of yj by xj , for j from
1 to n − 2. Furthermore, if yn−1 occurs in an equation E
of the form yn−1 = 0, then replace E by the equations
xn−1 = 0 and xn = 0. Otherwise, it must be the case
that for some k, p′(ok|an−1)yn−1 occurs in some (two) of
the other equations. In that case, replace that expression
by p(ok|an−1)xn−1 if p1(k) ≥ p2(k), and by p(ok|an)xn
otherwise. The transformation to apply on the inequational
part is trivial. 
Note that S(C) is finite, hence the U in Theorem 4.2 is
finite as well.
Example 4.3 (Binary hypothesis testing) The case n = 2
is particularly simple: the systems generated by C are all
those of the form
{p(oi|a1)x1 = p(oi|a2)x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
plus the two systems
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{x2 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
These systems are always solvable, hence we have m + 2
corner points, where we recall that m is the cardinality of
O.
Let us illustrate this case with a concrete example: let C
be the channel determined by the following matrix:
o1 o2 o3
a1 1/2 1/3 1/6
a2 1/6 1/2 1/3
The systems generated by C are:
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 12x1 =
1
6x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 13x1 =
1
2x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{ 16x1 =
1
3x2 , x1 + x2 = 1}
{x1 = 0 , x1 + x2 = 1}
The solutions of these systems are: (0, 1), (1/4, 3/4),
(3/5, 2/5), (2/3, 1/3), and (1, 0), respectively. The value
of Pe on these points is 0, 1/4, 3/10 (maximum), 1/3, and
0 respectively, and Pe is piecewise linear between these
points, i.e. it can be generated by convex combination of
these points and its value on them. Its graph is illustrated
in Figure 1, where x1 is represented by x and x2 by 1− x.
Example 4.4 (Ternary hypothesis testing) Let us con-
sider now a channel C with three inputs. Assume the
channel has the following matrix:
o1 o2 o3
a1 2/3 1/6 1/6
a2 1/8 3/4 1/8
a3 1/10 1/10 4/5
8
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
  1
  2
  3
  4
  5
  6
Figure 1. The graph of the Bayes’ risk for the channel in Example 4.3 and various bounds for it. Curve 1 represents
the probability of error if we ignore the observables, i.e. the function f(~x) = 1 − maxj xj . Curve 2 represents the
Bayes’ risk Pe(~x). Curve 3 represents the Hellman-Raviv bound 12H(A|O). Curve 4 represents the Santhi-Vardy
bound 1 − 2−H(A|O). Finally, Curves 5 and 6 represent the improvements on 3 and 4, respectively, that we get by
applying the method induced by our Proposition 3.5.
The following is an example of a solvable system generated
by C:
2
3x1 =
1
8x2
1
8x2 =
4
5x3
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
2
3x1 ≥
1
10x3
1
8x2 ≥
1
6x1
Another example is
1
6x1 =
3
4x2
x3 = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
The graph of Pe is depicted in Figure 2, where x3 is repre-
sented by 1− x1 − x2.
5 Maximum Bayes’ risk and relation with
strong anonymity
In this section we discuss the Bayes’ risk in the extreme
cases of maximum and minimum (i.e. 0) capacity, and, in
the second case, we illustrate the relation with the notion of
probabilistic strong anonymity existing in literature.
Maximum capacity If the channel has no noise, which
means that for each observable o there exists at most one
a such that p(o|a) 6= 0, then the Bayes’ risk is 0 for every
input’s distribution. In fact
Pe(~x) = 1−
∑
omaxj p(o|aj)xj
= 1−
∑
j
∑
o p(o|aj)xj
= 1−
∑
j xj = 0
Capacity 0 The case in which the capacity of the channel
is 0 is by definition obtained when I(A;O) = 0 for all pos-
sible input distributions of A. From information theory we
know that this is the case iff A and O are independent (cfr.
[8], page 27). Hence we have the following characteriza-
tion:
Proposition 5.1 Given an anonymity system 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉,
the capacity of the corresponding channel is 0 iff all the
rows of the channel matrix are the same, i.e. p(o|a) =
p(o|a′) for all o, a, a′.
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Figure 2. Ternary hypothesis testing. The solid curve represents the Bayes’ risk for the channel in Example 4.4, while
the dotted curve represents the Santhi-Vardy bound 1− 2−H(A|O).
The condition p(o|a) = p(o|a′) for all o, a, a′ has been
called strong probabilistic anonymity in [1] and it is equiv-
alent to the condition p(a|o) = p(a) for all o, a. The latter
was considered as a definition of anonymity in [4] and it is
called conditional anonymity in [12].
Capacity 0 is the optimal case also w.r.t. the capability of
the adversary of inferring the hidden information. In fact,
we can prove that the Bayes’ risk achieves its highest possi-
ble value, for a given n (cardinality ofA), when the rows of
the matrix are all the same and the distribution is uniform.
In this case, we have
Pe(
1
n
, 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) = 1−
∑
omaxj p(o|aj)xj
= 1−
∑
o p(o|a)
1
n
= 1− 1
n
∑
o p(o|a)
= n−1
n
An example of protocol with capacity 0 is the dining
cryptographers in a connected graph [4], under the assump-
tion that it is always one of the cryptographers who pays,
and that the coins are fair.
6 Application: Crowds
In this section we discuss how to compute the channel
matrix for a given protocol using automated tools, and use
it to improve the bound for the probability of error. We
illustrate our ideas on a variation of Crowds, a well-known
anonymity protocol from the literature.
In this protocol, introduced by Reiter and Rubin in [21],
a user (called the initiator) wants to send a message to a
web server without revealing its identity. To achieve that, he
routes the message through a crowd of users participating in
the protocol. The routing is performed using the following
protocol: in the beginning, the initiator selects randomly a
user (called a forwarder), possibly himself, and forwards
the request to him. A forwarder, upon receiving a message,
performs a probabilistic choice. With probability pf (a pa-
rameter of the protocol) he selects a new user and forwards
once again the message. With probability 1 − pf he sends
the message directly to the server.
It is easy to see that the initiator is strongly anonymous
wrt the server, as all users have the same probability of be-
ing the forwarder who finally delivers the message. How-
ever, the more interesting case is when the attacker is one
of the users of the protocol (called a corrupted user) which
uses his information to find out the identity of the initia-
tor. A corrupted user has more information than the server
since he sees other users forwarding the message through
him. The initiator, being the in first in the path, has greater
probability of forwarding the message to the attacker than
any other user, so strong anonymity cannot hold. How-
ever, under certain conditions on the number of corrupted
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Figure 3. An instance of Crowds with nine users in
a grid network. User 5 is the only corrupted one.
users, Crowds can be shown to satisfy a weaker notion of
anonymity called probable innocence.
In the original protocol, all users are considered to be
able to communicate with any other user, in other words the
connection graph is a clique. To make the example more
interesting, we consider a more restricted grid-shaped net-
work as shown in Figure 3. In this network there is a total
of nine users, each of whom can only communicate with the
four that are adjacent to him. We assume that the network
“wraps” at the edges, so user 1 can communicate with both
user 3 and user 7. Also, we assume that the only corrupted
user is user 5.
To construct the channel matrix of the protocol, we start
by identifying the set of anonymous facts, which depends
on what the system is trying to hide. In protocols where
one user performs an action of interest (like initiating a
message in our example) and we want to protect his iden-
tity, the set A would be the set of the users of the proto-
col. Note that the corrupted users should not be included
in this set, since we cannot expect the attacker’s own ac-
tions to be hidden from him. So in our case we have
A = {u1, u2, u3, u4, u6, u7, u8, u9} where ui means that
user i is the initiator.
The set of observables should also be defined, based on
the visible actions of the protocol and on the various as-
sumptions made about the attacker. In Crowds we assume
that the attacker does not have access to the entire network
(such an attacker would be too powerful for this protocol)
but only to the messages that pass through a corrupted user.
Each time that a user i forwards the message to a corrupted
user we say that he is detected which corresponds to an ob-
servable action in the protocol. Along the lines of other
studies of Crowds (eg [25]) we consider that an attacker will
not forward a message himself, since by doing so he would
not gain more information. So at each execution there is
at most one detected user and since only the users 2, 4, 6
and 8 can communicate with the corrupted user, we have
O = {d2, d4, d6, d8} where dj means that user j was de-
tected. As we explain later, there is also a non-zero prob-
ability that no user is detected, which is the case when the
d2 d4 d6 d8
u1 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.17
u3 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.17
u7 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.33
u9 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.33
u2 0.68 0.07 0.07 0.17
u4 0.07 0.68 0.17 0.07
u6 0.07 0.17 0.68 0.07
u8 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.68
Figure 4. The channel matrix of the examined in-
stance of Crowds. The symbols ui, dj mean that user
i is the initiator and user j was detected respectively.
message arrives to the server without passing by user 5.
After defining A,O we should model the protocol in
some formal probabilistic language. In our example, we
have modeled Crowds in the language of the PRISM model-
checker, that is essentially a formalism to describe Markov
Decision Processes. Then the channel matrix of conditional
probabilities p(o|a) must be computed, either by hand or
by using an automated tool like PRISM which can compute
the probability of reaching a specific state starting from a
given one. Thus, each conditional probability p(dj |ui) is
computed as the probability of reaching a state where the
attacker has detected user j, starting from the state where i
is the initiator. If pf < 1 there is always a non-zero proba-
bility of not detecting any user at all, which happens if the
message arrives at the server without passing by user 5. In
this case, the execution of the protocol passes completely
unnoticed by the adversary. Thus, in our analysis, we com-
pute all probabilities conditioned on the fact that some ob-
servation was made. This corresponds to normalizing the
rows of the table, that is dividing all p(o|ai) by
∑
i p(o|ai).
In Figure 4 the channel matrix is displayed for the ex-
amined Crowds instance, computed using a probability of
forwarding pf = 0.8. We have split the users in two
groups, the ones who cannot communicate directly with
the corrupted user, and the ones who can. When a user
of the first group, say user 1, is the initiator, there is a
higher probability of detecting the users that are adjacent
to him (users 2 and 4) than the other two (users 6 and
8) since the message needs two steps to arrive to the lat-
ters. So p(d2|u1) = p(d4|u1) = 0.33 are greater than
p(d6|u1) = p(d8|u1) = 0.17. In the second group users
have direct communication to the attacker, so when user 2
is the initiator, the probability p(d2|u2) of detecting him is
high. From the remaining three observables d8 has higher
probability since user 8 can be reached from user 2 in one
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Figure 5. The lower curve is the probability of error
in the examined instance of Crowds. The upper two
are the Santhi and Vardy’s bound and it’s improved
version.
step, while users 4 and 6 need two steps. Inside each group
the rows are symmetric since the users behave similarly.
However between the groups the rows are different which
is caused by the different connectivity to the corrupted user
5.
We can now compute the probability of error for this in-
stance of Crowds, which is displayed in the lower curve of
Figure 5. Since we have eight users, to plot this function
we have to map it to the three dimensions. We do this by
considering the users 1, 3, 7, 9 to have the same probability
x1, the users 2, 8 to have the same probability x2 and the
users 4, 6 to have the same probability 1−x1−x2. Then we
plot Pe as a function of x1, x2 in the ranges 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1/4,
0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1/2. Note that when x1 = x2 = 0 there are still
two users (4, 6) among whom the probability is distributed,
so Pe is not 0. The upper curve of Figure 5 shows the Santhi
and Vardy’s bound on the probability of error. Since all the
rows of the matrix are different the bound is not a tight one
as it can be seen in the Figure.
We can obtain a better bound by applying Proposi-
tion 3.5. The set of corner points, characterized by The-
orem 4.2, is finite and can be automatically constructed
by solving the corresponding systems of inequations. Af-
ter computing the corner points, it is sufficient to take
c = maxu Pe(~u)/h(~u), where h is the original bound,
and take c h as the improved bound. In our example we
found c = 0.925 which was given for the corner point
~u = (0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.08, 0.08, 0.08, 0.08).
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7 Appendix
We give here the proof of Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6 Let f : D(n) → R be the function f(~x) =
1 − maxj xj . Then f is convexly generated by f(U) with
U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Un where, for each k, Uk is the set
of all vectors that have value 1/k in exactly k components,
and 0 everywhere else.
Proof Observe that f coincides with the Bayes’ risk for a
channel C with 0 capacity, i.e. a channel in which for every
o, a, a′ we have p(o|a) = p(o|a′). In fact, the Bayes’s risk
for such channel is given by
Pe(~x) = 1−
∑
omaxj p(o|aj)xj
= 1−
∑
o p(o|a)maxj xj for a choosen a
= 1−maxj xj since
∑
o p(o|a) = 1
By Theorem 4.2, Pe is convexly generated by Pe(U), where
U is the set of solutions of the solvable systems in S(C).
Now, each such system is of the form
p(oi1 |aj1)xj1 = p(oi1 |aj2)xj2
p(oi2 |aj2)xj2 = p(oi2 |aj3)xj3
.
.
.
p(oir |ajk−1)xjk−1 = p(oir |ajk)xjk
xj = 0 for j 6∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jk}
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = 1
p(oih |ajh)xjh ≥ p(oih |a`)x` for 1 ≤ h, ` ≤ k, n
Which, given the fact that for all i, j, j′ the equality
p(oi|aj) = p(oi|aj′) holds, can be simplified to
xj1 = xj2
xj2 = xj3
.
.
.
xjk−1 = xjk
xj = 0 for j 6∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jk}
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn = 1
xjh ≥ x` for 1 ≤ h, ` ≤ k, n
A simple calculation shows that such a system has one (and
only one) solution ~u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) where
uj =
{
1
k
if j ∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jk}
0 otherwise
which concludes the proof. 
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